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Costa Rica 
- An Army-less Nation Facing External Threats 
 
 
Abstract 
This project aims to explain how Costa Rica deal with external threats. Having abolished their 
military in 1948, the small state of Costa Rica situated in the conflict-ridden region of Central 
America, is internationally portrayed as an inspirational nation upholding peace and high 
morality. This has raised questions in regards to how Costa Rica upholds security in the event of 
threat. The project applies the International Relations theories of neo-liberalism and neo-realism 
to two cases: the drug trafficking issue and the maritime agreement it stimulated, and the 
ongoing border conflict with Nicaragua, particularly the disagreement in 2010 that spurred the 
conflict anew. Additionally, neo-realism has been combined with the concept of ‘Hard Power’, 
whereas neo-liberalism is supported by ‘Soft Power’. From the theoretical frames we have 
extracted specific concepts, which are considered to be the most applicable in explaining small 
state behaviour, and turned these into concrete patterns of which Costa Rican actions and 
rhetoric can be captured. After our analysis of these events, it has become clear that Costa Rica 
fit into patterns of action and rhetoric that both neo-liberalism and neo-realism can explain. The 
process by which this happens is a result of the geopolitical situation they are in, which forces 
them to use hard power means although they prioritise on using soft power means. Through 
showing that Costa Rica use a combination of powers and that they are unexplainable by any one 
theory, it becomes clear that in order to conceptualise contemporary actions and behaviours of 
actors in the international system, theories need to include a broader set of variables. In regards 
to the conceptualisation of a state’s power, we suggest Joseph Nye’s term of ‘Smart Power’, as 
an alternative approach with the ability to explain the complexity of the small state Costa Rica. 
Additionally, this project highlights the importance of further developing IR theories in order for 
them to be applicable to small states as actors in the international society. 
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1) Introduction 
Since abolishing the military in 1948, Costa Rica has received much attention from the 
international society, and is regarded as an inspiration and predecessor of conducting an 
alternative foreign policy aiming for peaceful cooperation.      
  
“To political scientists, it (Costa Rica) represents a sort of third world paradise, a country that is 
superlatively democratic, stable and respectful of human rights” (Clark, 2001, p.1)  
  
Besides being continuously top-ranked on lists of Latin American democracies, Costa Rica also 
has the record of being the oldest democracy in Latin America, a democracy instituted in 1948. 
Economically, Costa Rica has been more stable than other Latin American countries, having 20 
percent lower economic volatility than the rest of the region and a lower percentage of the 
population living for less than 2 dollars a day. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s emphasis on education 
as a means of reaching development has given them one of the highest literacy rates in the world 
and raised the country to Middle Income Status (CIA, The World Factbook). The economy is 
highly connected with the stability Costa Rican society has experienced as professor Otto 
Feigenblatt argues: 
  
“While in the 1980s the headlines were filled with stories of civil wars and power politics from 
most Central American States, Costa Rica was busy developing ecotourism and actively 
participating in the global deliberation about sustainable development” (Feigenblatt, 2009, p.2) 
  
Costa Rica are strong supporters of international organizations such as United Nations, and the 
Organization of American States, arguing that these institutions provide the conditions for small 
states to gain influence despite the size and resources of the nations. Costa Rica has declared the 
promotion of human rights as the foundation for both national interest and their foreign policy. 
 
Despite having a foreign policy promoting peace and transnational cooperation, Costa Rica has 
been involved both in border conflicts and increased their defensive spending in the past decade. 
In 2010 Costa Rica was involved in a border dispute with neighbouring country Nicaragua 
invoking the police forces of Costa Rica and the military of Nicaragua. Although the dispute did 
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not escalate into a war or violence, and eventually was brought to the International Court of 
Justice, it did spur a debate internally in Costa Rica about whether to rearm. The conflict saw the 
government of Costa Rica improve their defensive infrastructure, such as heliports along the 
border, as well as re-establishing a previously abandoned paramilitary border police force 
(Military Balance, 2012, p.362). 
 
Furthermore enhancing drug trafficking problems in the entire Latin American region has led the 
nation to increase defence spending beyond the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. A change in the 
Costa Rica - United States joint Coast Guard Agreement against drug trafficking meant that 
Costa Rica opened its borders to 7000 US marines and 46 warships. The Costa Rican congress 
explained this change as a necessary mean to counter drug trafficking, and that the United States 
marines were only present to that effect (Wellen, 2010). This decision has given rise to debates 
within the nation, as the opposition claim the presence of  US troops to be a threat to national 
sovereignty (Inside Costa Rica, 2011). The abolishment of their military and focus on peace 
seems to be contradicted by the aforementioned examples. This indicates an internal dispute 
within the state, as the official political values seem to weaken from Costa Rican policies when 
they are facing external threats.   
  
1.1 Problem formulation 
The abolishment of the military forces, and consequently the implications this creates for Costa 
Rican foreign policy has caught our interests. Questioning the power Costa Rica have in order to 
secure its sovereignty and national interests our problem formulation is; 
  
Having abolished the military how does Costa Rica deal with contemporary external threats? 
  
1.2 Research question 
1 What is the explanatory power of neo-liberal and neo-realist takes on small state 
behaviour in relation to Costa Rica’s response to external threats?   
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1.3 Methodology 
The following chapter will elaborate on our methodological procedure and limitations. First, we 
will outline the purpose of our research. Secondly, we will illustrate the relationship between our 
theory and data, and thirdly the limitations and confinements of our research and the concepts 
and data selected to support this along with our research design. 
  
1.31 Purpose of our research 
The purpose of this project is, first and foremost, to understand how Costa Rica deal with 
contemporary external threats without having an army. We conduct this research in light of the 
apparent lack of exploration of small state behaviour in the grand approaches of International 
Relations.  
 
With this in mind, and guided by our research question, this project will shed light on how well 
the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism can be adapted in order to explain the unusual 
behaviour of the state of Costa Rica.  
  
Our research will be framed by the political context of Costa Rica. Specific concepts of the 
theoretical approaches, will be applied on our two selected cases. The border conflict of 2010 
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua and the increasing threat of drug trafficking intertwined with 
the increasing defence spending and The Maritime Agreement with the US. These cases will be 
the backbone of an analysis of how Costa Rica handle external threats, and how well the applied 
theories can explain the actions of the nation.  
  
1.32 Relationship between theory and data 
Our collection of data will consist of qualitative data such as articles, reports, books etc. Our 
project is dependent on secondary material, requiring us to be aware of subjective and unreliable 
sources. Our empirical data will derive from a combination of sources within the nation-state as 
well as outside. In gaining knowledge regarding, for instance, The Maritime Agreement between 
the United States and Costa Rica, we have been able to translate local newspapers and thereby 
extract the local views and information, as opposed to rely on sparse international coverage. 
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In terms of theory, the approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism do not directly focus on 
small state behaviour. Thus we have had to find and choose specific aspects of the approaches 
that concern small states. These aspects and concepts have then been transformed into patterns of 
behaviour which we search for in the cases, as for instance ‘skepticism towards cooperation.’ 
Such patterns will guide our analysis.  
 
Within the IR approach of neo-realism we use the work of Kenneth Waltz, especially his 
“Theory of International Politics.” From neo-liberalism we have mainly drawn from Robert 
Keohane and Joseph Nye’s complex interdependence theory and institutional liberalism. This 
creates two distinctive theoretical arguments on small state behaviour to apply to our empirical 
material and cases, and henceforth to the context of this project. In addition to this we implement 
the mid-range theories of soft and hard power that can be linked to neo-liberalism and neo-
realism respectively.  
  
1.33 Limitations and confinements 
This project will answer the question of how Costa Rica handle external threats without having 
an army. Since we regard Costa Rica as a unique nation-state, the conclusions in this project will 
naturally be contextual and limited in terms of generalising. This project will discuss neo-realism 
and neo-liberalism in terms of explaining Costa Rican rhetoric and actions, but will not be able 
to conclude the general utility of neo-realism and neo-liberalism in terms of explaining common 
small state behaviour in IR. From this, it is important to underline that this project is about the 
small state of Costa Rica, a state that is exhibiting unusual behaviour, and not about small states 
in IR in general. Furthermore it is crucial to note that the usage and possible scrutinizing of neo-
realism and neo-liberalism is confined to that of Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism, and to a similar 
degree that of the chosen neo-liberal theory. This means that when we critically engage the 
theoretical approaches we only dissert very specific and limited aspects of what we refer to in 
general terms as neo-realism and neo-liberalism.  
 
We have chosen to exclude certain characteristics of some concepts since, although they may be 
relevant, we do not have the time or space to fit them or substitute them in for other, more 
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relevant topics worth discussing. To be specific, we have chosen to exclude research into 
economy as a characteristic feature of hard power, as we do not deem it relevant enough to 
contemplate on, given the time and space restrainments of this project.  
 
The theories have been chosen because of their relevance and because they are some of the most 
dominant theories within the field of IR. The theories, we believe, will show different 
perspectives on the case of Costa Rica and an at the same time similarities. Our choice of theory 
has shaped a theoretical frame which the case can be examined from within. The frame makes it 
possible to be specific and detailed, and thus able to make a tangible and sharp conclusion. At 
the same time the theoretical frames limits the perspectives. Being two theories with a 
positivistic approach it limits research opportunity when applying the theories to the case. But 
due to the allowed volume of the paper and our hope to make a focused and precise assignment 
we have chosen to stay within the two theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. We will 
discuss further on this at the end of the paper. Here we will touch upon the next steps, what this 
assignment has contributed with, the limitations, and the choice of theory.  
 
1.4 Project structure 
Having presented our field of interest, our problem formulation, and discussed the methodology 
and limitations within our research, we intend to account for our theoretical framework. Having 
chosen the grand approaches of neo-liberalism and neo-realism to shed light on our cases of 
interest, we will assemble a chapter elaborating on these theories and their connection to the 
context of Costa Rica. Since the general literature would define Costa Rica as a small state, and 
we do acknowledge that, and neo-realism and neo-liberalism within the subject of International 
Relations pay most attention to big-state behaviour, we aim to extract the concepts applicable for 
small states such as Costa Rica. 
  
Starting off with a brief elaboration of the relation between liberalism and neo-liberalism, we 
will subsequently explain how small states are positioned in the international picture, and what 
their possibilities and predicted actions are according to neo-liberalism. Furthermore we will 
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connect neo-liberalism and the concept of soft power, aiming to create tangible patterns of neo-
liberal concepts to which we can fit Costa Rican behaviour in order to explain this.  
 
As the second part of our theoretical frames, we will expand on neo-realism's general positivistic 
approaches and neo-realistic takes on small state behaviour. Further we will again aim to explain 
neo-realistic notions on power which we consider to be connected with the concept of hard 
power. As in the neo-liberal chapter we will create a tangible pattern of neo-realistic concepts 
that we will look for in the Costa Rican behaviour. Questioning how Costa Rica deal with 
external threats, we will apply our theoretical frames on two selected events and Costa Rican 
official foreign policy, exemplifying Costa Ricas response to threats. Before starting the actual 
analysis we will make a sum-up of the theories and then extracting what patterns to search for, 
when trying to apply the theories on the cases involving Costa Rica.  
  
In the analysis we will start by looking at the official foreign policy of Costa Rica, in other words, 
the everyday policies and values of Costa Rica, acting as our point of departure. The everyday 
political values of Costa Rica, is the point of departure from which we will be able to identify 
deviations from the official policies. Following this, we explore the case of The Maritime 
Agreement between US and Costa Rica established in 1999, and furthermore expanded in 2010. 
In order to fully grasp how the theories can be applied we will outline how we expect Costa Rica 
to act in accordance to the two theories. How do we expect them to act in accordance to neo-
realism and how do we expect them to act in accordance to neo-liberalism, and then look at 1) 
the expected patterns and the actual actions and then 2) the expected patterns and the rhetoric 
used. In order to make it clear we will start with neo-realism and then neo-liberalism.   
 
Subsequently we apply the approach to the case of the border conflict between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua. Looking at the expected patterns within both theories and digging into actual actions 
and rhetoric used. Thus we will have the results of to which extent the two theories can explain 
Costa Rican response and behaviour in regards to external threats, and how well the theories can 
be applied. This leads us to answer our research questions and the problem formulation which 
has been presented above. 
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Concludingly we will answer the question of how Costa Rica handle external threats while 
having no military. The end of the paper contains a discussion on the limitations of our 
conclusion, and subsequently, which new considerations and ideas the process of our research 
has brought to mind.  
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2) Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism 
 
The following chapter will elaborate on the Neo-realist and Neo-liberalist assumptions of small 
state behavior, and their different definitions of power. Crucial to note is that neither neo-realism 
nor neo-liberalism explicitly deal with small state behavior, therefore the theoretical views 
presented in this chapter will be compressed. Within the approaches of neo-liberalism and neo-
realism terms and concepts have been carefully chosen in order to be applicable to the case of 
Costa Rica. These selected concepts represent the essence of the theories in explaining small 
state behaviour. 
2.1 Introduction 
The research on small states in the field of International Relations is very limited, and indeed the 
concept of ‘small state’ is quite imprecise and contested. Traditionally, small states have been 
defined in terms of population, differing from a nation with less than 10 million inhabitants to 
less than a million. In economic terms a small state can be identified when having: 
 
“Limited domestic opportunities leading to openness and susceptibility to adverse developments 
elsewhere; a narrow resource base leading to specialisation in a few products with associated 
export concentration and dependence on a few markets; shortage of certain skills and high per 
capita costs in providing government services; and greater vulnerability to natural disasters and 
greater reliance on overseas aid and various preferential agreements” (Sutton, 2011, p.143). 
 
Connected to this categorisation are the concepts of micro-states and middle-powers. Micro-
states are defined as states that cannot participate fully in the institutions of a system due to lack 
of administrative resources. Middle-powers are defined as states that have achieved ‘greatness’ 
in some other way than system wide domination (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p.7). In this regard a 
state such as Sweden would be defined as a middle-power as it is clearly a strong state with a 
high degree of internal cohesion and is able to project a clear image of itself to the outside world. 
Nonetheless Sweden will never have the resources to promote itself in all areas of foreign policy 
and be recognised as a system-wide great power. In the same sense a country such as 
Liechtenstein was denied access to the League of Nations because of the fact that it had chosen 
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to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty, and because it had no army. This state 
would be defined as a micro-state (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p.5). 
 
In accordance with the above, we identify Costa Rica neither as a micro-state nor as a middle-
power, and consequently categorise it as a small state. It is vital however to point out, that we 
believe Costa Rica exhibit features and actions that are beyond the common and vague small 
state definition. 
2.2 Neo-liberalism  
Neo-liberalism stems from the classical Liberal idealist school of thought, having an emphasis on 
multilateralism and international law, where small states are considered best off being part of 
international organisations (Neumann & Gstöhl 2004, p.7). Therefore, the neo-liberal school 
builds on the traditional liberal idea that conflict and war is not inevitable, and that human reason 
can overcome fear and lead to peace.  
 
Connected to the ‘rise’ of globalisation, neo-liberal theories emphasise the rise of the modern 
information technology and the gradual depletion of trade barriers resulting in the liberalisation 
of goods, services and capital, rendering borders less meaningful (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, 
p.11). This also means that global threats such as terrorism or drug trafficking forces nations to 
mobilize international coalitions and build institutions to address the shared threats and 
challenges (Tysha, 2005). For a small nation state such as Costa Rica, this implies that 
international cooperation and institutionalization is the main way to combat external threats.  The 
nature of the new transnational threats results in the fact that empowering others can help a 
nation-state to accomplish its own goals, hence countering international threats can be a plus-
sum-game (ibid.). It will not be possible for a single nation-state to counter the nature of the 
global threats spawned from globalisation, and therefore states might as well cooperate with each 
other. 
  
Although neo-liberals do not believe that institutions by themselves can guarantee peaceful 
relations between nation-states they do emphasise that international organisations can make 
cooperation easier and promote cooperative solutions to conflicts (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, 
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p.106). It would therefore make sense for states to use international organisations when solving 
conflicts as these can help alleviate the lack of trust that otherwise would be salient. It can 
therefore be expected that small nation-states will seek international cooperation in general, but 
also when facing threats. 
  
From this an increasing interdependence between states emerges in the sense that people and 
states are affected by what happens elsewhere (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p.101). Keohane and 
Nye argue that in this interdependent milieu the question of small and large states and their 
capabilities will not be as useful as in traditional International Relations theory, as resources are 
divided into different issue areas. By this logic small states will have specific areas where they 
are influential, for instance; Switzerland's influence on the financial sector, Danish and 
Norwegian influence on the international shipping arena, or the Costa Rican influence on human 
rights (Neumann & Gstöhl, 2004, p.5). In furtherance of this argument Keohane and Nye explain 
that international politics is becoming more like domestic politics in the sense that different 
international issues generate different coalitions both within governments as well as across them, 
and involve varying degrees of conflict. These conflicts will be dealt with less militarily, and 
therefore other skills are needed to navigate world politics, such as negotiation skills (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2010, p.104). This means that for a state such as Costa Rica, diplomacy and diplomatic 
skills will be crucial, and can be expected to be the chief way of approaching conflicts. 
 
For neo-liberalists international organisations play a huge role as they are not only the arena of 
small state political action, but also the arena for cooperation that can create absolute gains and 
mutual advantages (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p.37). Nation-states, small as well as big, will, in 
general, not care about relative gains in terms of how big a slice of the cake other states get as 
long as they themselves get a slice of the cake. This entails that Costa Rica should be placing 
international law and agreements before national interests, and be interested in handling conflicts 
with dialogue instead of military measures. This however should not be confused with the notion 
that small states will not have a national interest, but only that this interest primarily will be 
channeled through active participation in international organisations. 
 
14 
In terms of power, neo-liberalism can be linked to the term soft power. Though soft power is not 
directly linked to liberalism or for that matter realism - it is merely a form of power - it is 
however traditionally emphasised by liberal scholars (Tysha, 2005). The term soft power was 
first introduced by neo-liberal scholar Joseph Nye, and can crudely be defined as acquiring needs 
and wants through attraction rather than coercion. 
  
This form of power is founded upon relations with allies, economic assistance and cultural 
exchanges, and is generally used when pursuing value objectives such as human rights, 
democracy and freedom (Nye, 2011, p.84). In connection to this, a nation-state conducting soft 
power must be concerned with three basic resources: cultural, political, and foreign policy 
resources. This is so because a nation-state needs to be aware of its cultural values in places 
where it is attractive to others, live up to its political values both home and abroad, as well as 
being regarded as legitimate and having moral authority in terms of foreign affairs (ibid.). Joseph 
Nye underlines the importance of persuasion and attraction in connection to soft power, and 
argues that it is a mistake to see power only as power over someone, rather than power with 
someone. As Nye explains,  
 
“The production of soft power by attraction depends upon both the qualities of the agent and 
how they are perceived by the target. What produces attraction for one target may produce 
revulsion for another” (Nye, 2011, p.92).  
 
Soft power need not be a zero-sum or relative gains game. If two nation-states both become more 
attractive in each other’s eyes and therefore decreases the risk of conflict between them, then 
these absolute gains can create a positive sum game. In addition to this positive attraction is 
connected to how agents relate to each other in terms of, for instance, trust, sympathy, or 
credibility. Furthermore it is related to competence that can create admiration or respect. Lastly 
charisma is also a factor where a nation-state’s values and ideas can spur inspiration or 
adherence (Nye, 2011, p.92). Soft power therefore represents the notion of setting aside the one-
sided concepts of coercion and force, and instead focuses on attraction, persuasion, and creating 
absolute gains. 
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In terms of changing a state’s preferences, soft power is often linked to institutions as they can be 
used as a tool for changing other states preferences. Institutions can be used to legitimise a 
preferred agenda or arenas to frame an agenda in. Moreover there are two general ways that a 
state’s use of soft power can generate outcomes, the indirect and direct. In the direct way, leaders 
and government elites attract other government elites and leaders to create a preferred outcome. 
In the indirect way the civil society and other third parties such as organizations influence state 
leaders in accordance with their attraction or repulsion of a certain case. Hence, civil society, 
NGO’s or IGO’s can create a disabling or enabling environment in which a policy decision will 
be made. In connection to this is the passive approach to soft power that can be identified by the 
‘shining city on the hill effect’ in which the effects of an actors values can create attraction even 
though the actor did not purposely turn attention to oneself (Nye, 2011, p.94 p.). This could for 
example be the case of a country with a stable economy or political climate in an otherwise 
unstable region. 
 
Joseph Nye argues that being ‘the shining city on the hill’ - to sustain attraction over a longer 
period of time: “...requires consistency of practice with values” (Nye, 2011, p.100). To actively 
project attraction, frame agendas, and persuade others is extremely difficult. The path is often 
indirect along with the fact that governments rarely have full control over all the instruments of 
soft power. However states can be expected to try and manipulate their image in order to for 
instance gain international support. 
 
For example the instrument of public diplomacy is traditionally the action of a government 
communicating directly to the public of another nation-state in order to indirectly influence it. 
Using Costa Rica as an example this would imply that government leaders use speeches when 
attending international organizations to show the benignity of the nation-state. Although 
particularly with the case of Costa Rica, it is possible that they already have an advantage over 
other states after having abolished their military. The neo-liberal argument here is that in a world 
with enhanced global information and diffusion of power to non-state actors, soft power will 
become an increasingly important part of all nation-states’ foreign strategies (Nye, 2011, p.84). 
2.3 Neo-realism                                                                                                                
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The foundation of neo-realists scholars, is the belief that the state system is a self-help system. 
States, small and big, act in accordance to the system. Human nature and the normative 
perspectives seem ignored in preference of the idea of a scientific IR approach (Jackson & 
Sørensen, 2010, p.73). The foundation of Costa Rica is the same as China or Belgium since all 
states function in the same manner. The system is anarchic and self-based interests is in focus 
(Waltz, 1979, p.96). States are seen as unitary actors, acting in accordance with certain patterns 
and thus have an expected behaviour. Even though cultures, ideologies, and history are different 
in comparing the states they all act in compliance with self-based interests and with a focus of 
national sovereignty and security (ibid.). States are ranked, measured and distinguished in 
regards to their greater or lesser capabilities in performing similar tasks, and in regards to their 
power (Waltz, 1979, p.97). The power of Costa Rica can be measured in relation to the 
capabilities in handling, e.g., the border conflict with Nicaragua, compared to how other states 
would be capable of handling it. The first priority of Costa Rica, in the eyes of neo-realism, is 
survival and security (Waltz, 1979, p.105). The focus on diplomacy, institutions and internal 
matters is not relevant (Waltz, 1979, p.75). What goes on inside Costa Rica or metaphorically 
inside the billiard ball is not interesting, since the ball is determined by external forces acting on 
it. The structure of the play is of importance. State sovereignty in regards to neo-realism is being 
in a position to decide a condition compared to independence, and it is the power differences 
among states that explain international relations (Waltz,1979, p.76). The theory of neo-realism 
predicts interests and motives of the states (Waltz, 1979, p.122). 
 
All states including the small states, Waltz argues, stand in the shadow of impending violence. 
“The state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz, 1979, p.102). And states must be prepared to use 
violence at any time or live at the mercy of their military-possessed, more vigorous neighbours 
(Waltz, 1979, p.102).  
 
”Nationally as internationally, contact generates conflict and at times issue violence. The 
difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force but in the 
different modes of organization for doing something about it” (Waltz, 1979, p.103).  
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The nature of the state of Costa Rica is the nature of war, and when dealing with external threats 
and being in contact with other states, this will be conflictual. 
 
Being a small state in a self-help system, bandwagoning or/and balance of power is a normal and 
expected way to act. Since the system is mainly controlled by the Great Powers, small and big 
states will use one of these two means in order to keep their own territory secure. In general a 
state will use its means in order to balance power and ideally create world domination (Waltz, 
1979, p.118). The balancing of power though can be used in combination with bandwagoning. 
As stated by neo-realists, a state can either come to the defence of the weaker side or bandwagon 
with the powerful state, exploiting their power and capabilities. Bandwagoning is mainly used 
when a state ‘likes the leader’ and can see an opportunity to secure its own state sovereignty and 
security. While balancing can leave states in the mercy of the stronger states, bandwagoning is a 
functional behaviour; 
 
”...where gains are possible even for the losers and where losing does not place their security in 
jeopardy. Externally states work harder to increase their own strength, or they combine with 
others, if they are falling behind” (Waltz, 1979, p.126).  
 
It is worth mentioning that imbalance of power in a system threatens especially the weaker states. 
Hence imbalance might encourage the powerful states to attain greater control and dominating 
ambitions (Waltz, 1979, p.132). It needs to be mentioned that even though bandwagoning is a 
means for small states, the more dependent a state is on another, and the less its leverage is over 
that, the more it must focus on how the decision of other states affects its access to supplies and 
markets on which its welfare or survival may depend. This describes the conditions of life for 
states that are no more than the equal of many others (Waltz, 1979, p.153). Keeping in mind that 
in the case of Costa Rica, the US is involved in their fight against drug trafficking (The Maritime 
Agreement), and subsidize the country in many aspects; a dependent state such as Costa Rica 
would seem to conform their behaviour to the preferences of those they depend on (Fox, 1998, 
p.iii; Waltz, 1979, p.157). A small state like Costa Rica have to use their combined capabilities 
and bandwagon in order to gain rank and power in a neo-realistic context, which depends on how 
a state scores on several parameters, military strength being one of them. 
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Neo-realists do not only emphasise on military power but also emphasise on other means, which 
is relevant to an army less nation. Countries can exert political influence even without having a 
military. Low politics concerning for instance economics, have replaced military concerns at the 
top of the international agenda (Waltz, 1979, p.152), Costa Rica can be a part of, and even have a 
degree of influence, in the political world arena, even though they do not have a military, but as 
mentioned above a small state gain the most influence by having a certain feature, ability or a 
certain area of competencies and knowledge. 
 
Neo-realists argue that a state such as Costa Rica would no longer seek additional power if it 
meant a compromise of security. A division of power and security has to be done. More power 
does not necessarily imply greater security, as the presence of the US in Costa Rica does not 
necessarily imply security. “Having armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and 
buy more arms because the means to anyone’s security is a threat to someone else who in turn 
responds by arming” (Waltz, 1979, p.186). The maximising of power, which should increase 
security, is no good if it induces a balancing response from others. Power and security is then 
relative and the more a state maximises their power or strengthens their security, the more others 
will interpret the state as a threat and unite against it. In the case of Costa Rica this is both 
interesting and relevant because 1) Costa Rica has no army, and 2) the ties with the US seems 
comprehensive. Thus maximising power may leave a state more powerful, but less secure (Waltz, 
1979, p.187). In relation to security we find that freedom and control is correlated. Waltz claims 
that freedom is proportional in relation to insecurity. The more control the more security, less 
control means increase of insecurity but more freedom (Waltz, 1979, p.112). 
 
Another crucial point when applying the theory of neo-realism is their focus on relative gains 
and the zero-sum assumption (Powell, 1991). Cooperation may be necessary in order to balance 
power, but the concern for relative gains will limit that cooperation due to the natural scepticism 
of other states, their behaviour and self-interests. In neo-realism relative gains mean that a loss of 
one state is a gain of another due to the zero-sum assumption (Powell, 1991, p.1303). A gain for 
one state is a loss for another, thus making cooperations more difficult (ibid). 
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Relative gains in relation to power are more important than absolute gains. Relative gains sets 
the analysis to look at how states are doing relative to each other, since security is a scarce good 
and absolute gains in power may lead to a relative decline in security (Powell, 1991, p.1305). 
Thus Costa Rica, when facing threats, will pay attention to achievements of other nations and 
react according to this. A main part of the neo-realist theory is the term of power, especially, 
when analysing Costa Rica and their lack of military capabilities. The neo-realistic take on 
power can be compared to what is defined as hard power. This involves the various political and 
military uses of armed force: deterrence, nuclear weapons, war, armed intervention and so forth 
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p.85). When focusing on hard power the definition needs to be clear: 
 
“In international politics, having “power” is having the ability to influence another to act in 
ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power is the capacity to coerce 
them to do so. Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and 
economic sanctions to enforce national interests....” (Wilson, 2008, p.114) 
 
Furthermore:  
 
“Hard power is about compelling your adversary to comply with your will through the threat or 
use of force. Soft power is about attracting your partner to share your goals through dialogue 
and exchange.” (Copeland, 2010)  
 
The outcome of hard power is to kill, capture and defeat. The techniques of this is by sanctions, 
coercive means, followed by weapons and military power. The hard power is thus related to the 
zero-sum game and results in fear and suspicion (ibid.). Nye describes hard and soft power as the 
use of sticks or carrots of economy and military, pointing out that it is much cheaper to attract 
than the use of coercion (Nye, 2011)  
 
The security dilemma is also relevant in the case of Costa Rica. Their ties with US and their 
regional context makes this term extremely interesting. When upgrading national security tools; 
military, defence budget, enforcement of police, strong alliances etc., a state will automatically 
create scepticism, and be perceived as a bigger threat, among neighbouring countries - no matter 
what the motivation is. This is the so-called security dilemma, whereas one needs to distinguish 
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between power and security. More power does not necessarily imply greater security: “Having 
armed for the sake of security, states feel less secure and buy more arms because the means to 
anyone’s security is a threat to someone else who in turn responds by arming” (Waltz, 1979, 
p.186). The maximising of power, which should cause security, is no good if it induces a 
balancing response from others. Power and security is then relative and the more a state 
maximises their power or strengthens their security, the more others will interpret the state as a 
threat and unite against it. Thus maximising power may leave a state more powerful, but less 
secure (Waltz, 1979, p. 187).  
2.4 Sum up of the two theories 
Neo-liberals would expect small states to take part in international cooperation and international 
organizations in the focus of collective security. This will be necessary not only for small states 
but states in general because of the nature of threats to the nation-state. Small states can 
furthermore be expected to establish certain issue areas where they can gain influence in 
international relations. Therefore the Costa Rican focus on human rights and non-violent 
solutions do not come as a surprise for neo-liberalists. A nation-state such as Costa Rica can, in 
the neo-liberal sense, therefore be expected to handle threats by international cooperation, 
organisations, diplomacy, and the soft power tools of attraction, persuasion and diplomacy. 
 
Neo-realism would expect Costa Rica to be concerned with their national security. In regards to 
relative gains and the zero-sum assumption neo-realism would expect Costa Rica to focus on 
their own interests. Due to the natural scepticism towards other states, and since states are 
defined by the nature of war, the contact with other states will expectedly cause conflicts. Costa 
Rica can be expected to use hard power means as threats, deterrence, and force. Due to the lack 
of a military, the nation should search for hard power tools elsewhere, or consider reestablishing 
their military. Therefore Costa Rica would be expected to bandwagon or/and balance power in 
order to secure their own sovereignty and security. If so, the security dilemma would gain 
relevance, since Costa Rica can be perceived to posit a kind of new power and thus become a 
threat in international relations. 
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3) Operationalisation 
In order to operationalise the conceptions of neo-liberalism and neo-realism we will look for 
specific patterns when analysing our two cases. The more the actions of Costa Rica fit into these 
patterns the better we can expect the respective approaches to be able to explain them. The 
patterns we will search for will be based on the carefully chosen concepts within neo-liberalism 
and neo-realism in connection to small state behaviour.  
 
Our understanding of Costa Rica along with our theoretical frames, convinces us to divide the 
analysis into two tracks; a neo-liberal analysis of the rhetoric and actions of Costa Rica, and a 
neo-realist analysis of the rhetoric’s and actions of Costa Rica. This will be divided into each 
case. Figure 1 illustrates how the progress in the next section will be: 
 
                  
 
First, the case of The Maritime Agreement, and secondly the Nicaraguan border conflict case 
will be used. The reason for doing this is because we believe there is a difference between what 
the Costa Rican government says and what it actually does. Furthermore, rhetoric is a crucial 
part of their foreign policy in general, and therefore, also when handling external threats or 
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conflicts. To understand and research on how Costa Rica deal with external threats we thus find 
it crucial to dig into both their use of rhetoric and actual actions.   
  
In the following section we will analyse the case of Costa Rica in the two tracks (see figure 1). 
First we will outline the neo-realist and neo-liberalist patterns of small state behaviour, meaning 
how the two approaches would expect a small state to behave. Secondly we will look at the two 
cases in order to analyse to which degree the actions of Costa Rica fit in the neo-realist and neo-
liberal patterns of behaviour. These patterns will as mentioned earlier be divided into rhetorics 
and actions. 
  
3.1 Neo-realist patterns 
3.11 Actions 
The concepts of neo-realism that are relevant in the case of Costa Rica, is the foundation of the 
patterns we will be looking for. Having the specific focus on relative gains, bandwagoning, 
balance of power, own interests, and scepticism towards other states we expect Costa Rica to act 
with: 
● Scepticism towards cooperation  
● High degree of defensive or military spending 
● A bandwagoning or balancing behaviour 
● Alliances in relation to national security and survival 
● Hard power measures such as coercion, force and deterrence 
● Strategic positioning of forces 
 
3.12 Rhetoric 
Again we will expect Costa Rica to use rhetoric that emphasises on national sovereignty, security 
and own interests. Thus we search for these rhetorical patterns: 
● Emphasis on national sovereignty and national security - i.e. speaking about borders and 
territory 
● The use of hard power means basing their rhetoric on threats and deterrence 
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● Focus on relative gains  
● Emphasis on own interests 
  
3.2 Neo-liberalist patterns 
3.21 Actions 
In terms of the concepts of relevance within the neo-liberal approach such as international 
cooperation, diplomacy, international organizations, human dimension, we expect to find that 
Costa Rica will take the following path in their approach to foreign policy: 
● Use of international institutions and international law 
● Practice restraint when conflicts arise 
● Create cooperative agreements against non-state threats with the aim of absolute gain 
  
3.22 Rhetoric 
In relation to the expected actions and the choice of concepts within the theory of neo-liberalism, 
we expect Costa Rica to focus on human rights to gain influence in the international system. 
Hence Costa Rica is expected to emphasise on international cooperation and collective security. 
We will search for these specific patterns within the rhetoric:  
● Emphasis on cooperation and transnational solutions to transnational threats 
● Strong support and promotion of institutions 
● Speak in terms of cooperative efforts 
● Focus on non-violent resolution 
● Promoting a specific issue-area  
● Interests that cross borders  
● Use of soft power terms such as attraction and persuasion 
 
In the next part we will, following figure 1, analyse one case at a time. However before doing so, 
we will elaborate on Costa Rican ‘everyday’ political values, how they officially promote 
themselves, and which ideals their actions build upon.  
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Secondly, we will shortly present the cases of interest. We have decided to start with the actions 
in each case and within each theory. This is a deliberate choice in order to give the reader an 
understanding of the actual events. We believe this creates a better opportunity to understand the 
rhetoric and the authenticity this may or may not contain.  
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4) Neo-realistic and neo-liberalistic patterns applied 
on Costa Rica 
Assuming that Costa Rica’s overall policies, and their response to external threats are largely 
coherent, we will now elaborate on the political values of Costa Rica. Thus an elaboration on 
how Costa Rica has promoted itself internationally, and how the nation is perceived in the 
international society, will create an understanding of the dynamics of Costa Rican politics and 
actions. 
 
Having abolished their military it seems that Costa Rica is left as a small state without the means 
to secure their borders and interests with the resources defining hard power. Therefore Costa 
Rica has deliberately constructed an image of being a nation founded on strong values of human 
rights, cooperation and peacefulness. Officially claiming that their national interest and foreign 
policy is constituted by the promotion of human rights (Crahan, p.550), Costa Rican leaders 
further state that the nation find “The limitations of neorealist strategies (...) of national interests 
too narrow” (Crahan, p.549), and furthermore they officially reject neo-realist approaches. On 
the other hand, Costa Rica has declared the nation to be neutral, strongly suggesting that it is a 
strong promoter of peace and non-violent acts. Simultaneously, it is a symbolic decision 
emanating from liberal idealism. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Costa Rican 
nation: “...calls with equal zeal by the values of peace, peaceful coexistence among nations, 
democracy, human rights and international law as a means of resolving conflicts...” (The Costa 
Rica News, 2012). The claim, that conflicts should be solved by international law, rather than 
with the use of force, highlights Costa Rica's acceptance of the importance of the international 
society, the emphasis they have on collective security, and reflects their disregard for national 
interest.  
 
Without the military to secure the nation’s territory and interests, Costa Rica chooses to rely on 
neo-liberalistic features of international law and international organisations, arguably a strategy 
to ensure collective security. Hence, the nation is gaining influence and securing national 
interests through the small state strategy of adopting a more specific area of interest, calling for 
the international attention i.e. the Costa Rican focus on international human rights. Costa Rica 
argues that their engagement in international organisations provide them with a context where 
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small states can compensate for their deficiencies in size and resources (Crahan, p. 549). 
Therefore, Costa Rica's advocacy of an issue-area, in the form of human rights are in line with 
the expectations of a small state emphasising neo-liberal values. Acknowledging their limitations 
due to its resources, Costa Rica compensates with active institutionalism. This is even more 
explicit in Costa Rica's engagement in international organisations, and thus their belief in the 
possibilities of absolute gain where mutual long-term benefits are present. Besides taking part in 
the founding of United Nations (UN), Costa Rica also appeared as a leader in the construction of 
'The Universal Declaration of Human Rights', 'The Convention of the Right of a Child', 'The 
American Declaration of the Right and Duties of Man', and 'The American Convention of 
Human Rights” (Crahan, p.551). Furthermore Costa Rica was acknowledged by the UN as a 
peaceful and harmonic society being chosen to be the homeland for the UN university of peace 
(ibid.). 
 
With a foreign policy founded on human rights, Costa Rica's goals are not limited to their 
national interests, but are beneficial to individuals globally. Hence, their interests are crossing 
borders, aiming for an absolute gain for the world population. This way, the emphasis on human 
rights has become the specific issue-area of Costa Rica, positioning them as a leading nation 
within the promotion and development of human rights. 
The former President, José Figueres, notably said that “...intervention was preferable to letting a 
neighbour’s home burn and that respect for human dignity was more important than borders” 
(Crahan, p.555); thus saying that the responsibility for human dignity is greater than sovereignty. 
This is in line with UN's initiative of 'Responsibility to Protect' (UN, The Responsibility to 
Protect). In 2004, the Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber went a step further, and declared 
peace as a fundamental human right (WILPF, 2011), hereby presenting itself as the first country 
in the world to state peace as a fundamental human right. Also justified by its initiatives in 
promoting human rights in the global scenario. In line with this, Oscar Arias, stated that Costa 
Rica, 
 
“...seek (in Central America) not peace alone, not peace to be followed some day by political 
progress, but peace and democracy, together, indivisible, an end to the shedding of human blood, 
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which is inseparable from an end to the suppression of human rights” (Nobelprize - Acceptance 
Speech).  
 
This reflects that violence is not inherent to human nature, whereas conflict and violence can be 
avoided between nations. The country's commitment is not limited to its neighbours, rather it is 
promoted transnationally as a common goal for all nations. Chinchilla has notably been quoted 
for saying that: “As global citizens, we need to face the future together (...) There are no 
passengers in this planet; we are all crew members.” (UN University). A statement coloured by 
an emphasis on transnationality and complex interdependence. Stating that the future is shared, 
not depending on borders, she is clearly suggestion that shaping the future is a global project that 
cannot be operationalised by nation states alone, crucially connected with an increased 
interdependency and transnational threats.  
 
The Costa Rican Government has since 1948 favoured a diplomatic and peaceful discourse in the 
event of a conflict: “...this is our strength, the strength of reason and not the strength of arms” 
(CNN, 2010). In other words, Costa Rican power is not defined by military resources, but rather 
the power of dialogue, cooperation and peaceful resolutions, connected with the concept of soft 
power. 
 
According to neo-realist scholars, abolishing the military could have crucial consequences for a 
nation’s security and power in the international structure of hierarchy. Lacking the resources to 
defend the territory of the nation and its national interests will, according to neorealism leave 
Costa Rica powerless and without any international influence. But as Costa Rica argue, engaging 
in institutions is their possibility, being a small state, to gain influence and power in the 
international society. Therefore their emphasis on institutionalism also compensates for their 
limited capabilities, and might be argued to secure the nations due to collective security.  
 
Being a promoter of human rights, and being a role model of democracy and peaceful values in 
the international society there might not be a need for military forces. Since the abolishment of 
the military, Costa Rica have sustained a history of peace and have neither been involved in civil 
wars, nor international wars. Instead they have engaged in the fight for human rights, 
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participated in regional peace processes i.e. The Central American Peace Process of 1987 – a 
peace plan set forth by Costa Rican president Oscar Arias - which lead to immediate cease fire 
throughout the entire region, the requirement of free elections, the ceasing of all foreign military 
aid and respect for human rights, provided the necessary conditions for a reduction in military 
spending in the majority of the nations of the region (Spencer, 1997, 1 pp; Rankin, 2012, p.149). 
Arias later won the international Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. All of this in a region 
impacted by conflicts and wars. This makes the nation of Costa Rica an inspiration in the 
international picture. 
 
Therefore, the image, and hence the use of rhetoric and promotion of values, are the only way to 
secure the nation. Chinchilla has stated that "Costa Rica will never reconsider its decision to 
abolish the army... Rather the absence of an army has been a guarantee of security in the 
country," (BBC NEWS, 2011). This indicates that the president still has a strong belief in 
conducting a neo-liberal foreign policy. But the statement further suggests that the lack of 
military forces has been a strategy to secure the nation. This is strongly connected with another 
statement from Chinchilla; “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the 
north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.” (Sanchez, 2011). 
Portrayed as a nation of morality and credibility, but also defenceless, the dynamics of their 
conflicts changes. As Costa Rica is deeply engaged in the international society, and is officially 
driven by the goal of establishing transnational relationships and absolute gains, one can only 
suggest how an attacking nation would be perceived. Chinchilla is aware of this, not only 
reminding the international society that Costa Rica only have the means of soft power, but also 
classifying threatening countries as being cowards. 
  
The Costa Rican use of soft power is evident in their rhetoric and official statements. Professor 
Otto Von Feigenblatt states that: “...the international community finds it amazing that a nation 
(Costa Rica) can actually do what it preaches” (Feigenblatt, 2008). After abolishing the military, 
Costa Rica has partially, through their use of rhetoric, promoted itself as a nation founded on 
neo-liberalist values. The international society has credited the nation by accepting them as a 
leading nation within the promotion of human rights, and perceive Costa Rica as an inspiration, 
as the state transforms its values into political actions. This international recognition of Costa 
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Rica and their political history has positioned the nation as an example of 'The Shining City on 
the Hill'. 
 
“Costa Rica has succeeded in projecting itself nationally and internationally as a highly 
equitable, cohesive society, that champions human rights out of a deep rooted idealism, thereby 
enjoying considerable moral credibility internationally” (Crahan, p.550). 
 
Costa Rica benefits from their image, creating an alluring attraction from the international 
society, which creates “...a more favourable public opinion and credibility abroad” (Tysha, 
2005). Attraction is the core element in the definition of soft power by Wilson: “...having the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” (ibid.). Alongside 
with the abolishment of the military, Costa Rican official foreign policy is officially dependent 
on soft power and the nation can be said to be constrained to continually being portrayed as 
honest and reliable rather than manipulative (Nye, 2011, p.92). A shift in values, or a 
discrepancy in official statements and actual actions could consequently have crucial aftermaths 
in Costa Rica's international influence and power. Therefore, if the Costa Rican image is 
damaged, and their success in using soft power decreases, the nation will ultimately be left with 
no power as they would have neither their attraction nor any hard power tools. 
 
4.2 The Maritime Agreement  
4.21 Brief outline of The Maritime Agreement 
The first case we examine is The Maritime Agreement between Costa Rica and the US, agreed 
upon in 1999 in order to combat the increasing problems of drug trafficking and illicit traffic by 
sea (US Department of State, 1999, p.1). The agreement between the US Coast Guards and the 
Costa Rican government aimed at reducing narcotics, illegal immigrants, illegal fishing, and 
narcotic trafficking (US Department of State, 2012). In this agreement only the US Coast Guard 
were allowed to patrol Costa Rican waters, with Costa Rican law enforcement onboard if 
necessary (Shansky, 2010).  
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However in 2010 a radical change in this agreement was made and the coast guard cooperation 
changed character. The congress of Costa Rica decided to open its country to 46 U.S. warships 
(following helicopters and planes) and 7.000 U.S. marines from July through to the end of the 
year with the following task: “The U.S. military’s stated mission is to interdict drug dealers and 
arm merchants, as well as expedite humanitarian missions” (Wellen, 2010). Under this new 
agreement not only the US Coast Guards, but also The US Navy, meaning military personnel, 
have been allowed to patrol Costa Rican waters.  
 
This expansion and militarization of the agreement spurred great unrest within the Costa Rican 
society, claiming that the agreement with its military representation should be a big concern in a 
non-violent country, and that it violated national sovereignty (Inside Costa Rica, 2011; Shansky, 
2010). The expansion of the allowance of the navy ships was especially in focus along with the 
debate of whether or not it is against the actual Maritime Agreement from 1999. The opponents 
of the new arrangements argue that the increase of the forces are disproportionately large, 
disproportionately destructive, and that this is against both the national constitution and the 
official agreement as Juan Carlos Mendoza, head of the Citizen Action Party of Costa Rica 
argues: 
 
"We want to fight drug trafficking, but we do not accept the docking or prolonged stay of 
military ships in our country, because it violates our Constitution and our national sovereignty” 
(Shansky, 2010). 
  
4.22 Neo-realist patterns and actions in The Maritime Agreement 
When looking for patterns of neo-realism in relation to The Maritime Agreement with the US, it 
is possible to trace the patterns of Costa Rica - US relations all the way back to the decision of 
abolishing the military in 1948. Though the cooperative action initially appears to go against 
neo-realist thinking, the action of abolishing the military fits within the operationalised patterns 
as it has been argued that then-president José Figueres abolished the military “...to remove the 
potential for armed insurrection against his government, and he was confident he could count on 
the United States to protect Costa Rica against any external threat” (Rankin, 2012, p.114). This 
suggests that the action of abolishing the military had a more cynical side. It implies the forming 
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of an alliance, or bandwagoning behaviour, allowing Costa Rica to redirect spending from 
defensive budgets to education and health care programs leading to their current position as one 
of the wealthiest nations of the Central American region. But why would the US help Costa 
Rica? The enticement to protect Costa Rica can be found in the prospect of attaining a non-
communist ally in the Central American region, in the early years of the Cold War (Rankin, 2012, 
p.115 pp.). In light of this it should come as no surprise that Costa Rica signed a Maritime 
Agreement with the US in 1999, officially, in order to counter drug trafficking problems (US 
Department of State, 1999, 1).   
 
However as the brief introduction showed, the expansion of the agreement in 2010, including the 
introduction of 7000 US troops and additional material, came with a very tangible military 
measure. The immanent threat of drug cartels is a problem of national security for Costa Rica, 
and the expansion of The Maritime Agreement reinforces the lack of hard power Costa Rica is 
otherwise characterised by. When looking at the movement of the drug cartels it is evident that 
the drugs flowing through Costa Rica come from the sea. Having reached Costa Rican shores, 
the drug route moves inland through the national parks and jungles in the state. In this logic it 
makes sense to have both US Coast Guard vessels and US Navy to enter Costa Rican waters, if 
the threat of drug trafficking is indeed so challenging to Costa Rican national security. Stating 
the official reason for The maritime Agreement, and their official mission with Costa Rica is to 
interdict, or terminate drug trafficking, it would make sense to help the police force inland as 
well.  
 
This should be feasible as the agreement according to the US embassy gives the navy personnel: 
“...freedom of movement and the right to carry out activities they consider necessary for the 
fulfillment of their mission..”(Shansky, 2010). This could easily be interpreted as immunity from 
any action deemed appropriate in the name of drug combating (ibid.). 
 
Supporting this is the fact that Costa Rican national park rangers are struggling with combating 
the drug trafficking problems in the jungle areas (Corta, 2012). However when looking at the 
number of US troops actively stationed in Costa Rica from 2010 to September 2012, no higher 
than nine troops have been stationed on Costa R
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of Defense, 2011). When expanding The Maritime Agreement to allow navy ships and military 
personnel in Costa Rican waters one could at least expect to see a great deal of navy and Coast 
Guard vessels combating the drug problems by the Costa Rican shores, but by February 2011 
only two navy ships had been deployed to Costa Rica. Furthermore, after the Costa Rican 
government agreed to open their ports to American navy ships in 2012 only one has actually 
docked. This limited amount of action by the US seems strange, seeing that the main purpose of 
the expansion of the agreement was to allow the US navy the same rights as the Coast Guard. 
Why have the navy not been used more if the drug problems are that serious? This implies that 
the expansion of The Maritime Agreement might have more than one purpose (Stuart, 2012; 
Friendship Office of the Americas, 2011).  
 
First of all the action of expanding The Maritime Agreement is an outcome of Costa Rica’s 
choice to receive assistance from another nation-state even though this confines them: 
 
“...meaning that the state decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external 
problems, including whether or not to seek assistance from others and in doing so to limit its 
freedom by making commitments to them”(Waltz, 1979, p.96).   
 
The commitment to the US symbolised by The Maritime Agreement draws back to the initial 
argument for the abolishment of the military; that the US can be counted on to protect Costa Rica 
when facing external threats. If needed, Costa Rica rely on the hard power means provided by 
the US. However we expect the concept of relative gains to have an effect on the agreement, and 
therefore expect the US to benefit from the expansion of the agreement as well. This can be 
identified with a statement from the US navy explaining that they “...will also have secondary 
missions of sea control and power projection...”(Kozloff, 2010). This provides evidence for the 
argument that The Maritime Agreement between Costa Rica acts as a double-edged sword; it 
equips Costa Rica with hard power tools, or at least the ability to deter, as well as giving the US 
the possibility to show the region and the drug cartels their powers. Furthermore the lack of 
transparency in terms of finding official information on the agreement, supports the claim that 
there is even more to The Maritime Agreement than meets the eye.  
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The enhancement of The Maritime Agreement, and therefore the possible presence of US navy 
ships in Costa Rican waters, has indirectly given Costa Rica the hard power measure of 
deterrence, but has also sparked a security dilemma. The enhancement of military measures that 
the combat against drug trafficking spurs, entails that when the US projects their power, and lend 
that power to an ally, this will create a balancing reaction elsewhere.  
 
It is definitely interesting to raise the question whether there is a correlation between the initial 
maritime agreement from 1999 and the rise of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Venezuela 
relations with the US has been tense since Chavez gained power, and Venezuela is currently one 
of the four top spenders in regards to defence spending in Latin America, as well as receiving 
credit for arms procurement from Russia (Military Balance, 2012, p.364). Chavez, known for his 
anti-american rhetoric, has led his country into an alliance with Nicaragua, incorporating them 
into the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas - ALBA. This has led Venezuela to become the 
second most favoured destination for Nicaraguan exports, as well as selling oil at a cheap rate 
and lending money to support Nicaraguan infrastructure and long term development (Hoskyns & 
Mcknight, 2012). The alliance has as one of its goals to counter the American free trade 
agreements that Costa Rica for instance has fully embraced (Kozloff, 2010). With Nicaragua 
apparently siding with Venezuela, The Maritime Agreement can be seen as a consolidation of the 
alliance between the United States and Costa Rica, counterbalancing Nicaragua and Venezuela 
(ibid.). Here Costa Rica are clearly bandwagoning with the US, and because states can never 
trust other states’ intentions, one upgrading of an alliance, as the expansion of The Maritime 
Agreement can be interpreted to be, will naturally spur an upgrade or counter alliance.  Therefore 
Costa Rica could very well be in the midst of a bigger geopolitical game, pouring even more 
symbolic meaning into The Maritime Agreement with the US, and the recurring border conflict 
with Nicaragua. 
  
Even though The Maritime Agreement might symbolise a bigger regional and long-term power 
struggle, the agreement can create hurdles in the short run. As long as Costa Rica and the US 
both gain an advantage relative to each other their cooperation can be expected to continue, but 
the suspicion connected to cooperation in this climate is evident as indicated by member of the 
oppositional party PAC, Juan Carlos Mendoza:“...it is not clear what other strategic military 
34 
goals they (The United States) have, besides combating drug trafficking.” (Sanchez, 2011). 
Skepticism towards an ally such as the US fits well into our outlined patterns as it implies that 
any gain or advantage of one state, is a loss for the other (Powell 1991, p.1303). That is to say, if 
the US gain more out of the agreement than Costa Rica, it would ultimately be considered a bad 
deal. Additionally the reaction of the opposition to expansion of the agreement shows a general 
concern towards national sovereignty and security, an understandable concern for a small state. 
In general the maritime agreement can both be seen as a short-term measure against the 
imminent problem of drug trafficking, and as a part of a bigger long-term geopolitical struggle.  
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that Costa Rica is in no way incapable of using hard 
power or taking defensive precautions on themselves. When turning the attention to Costa Rican 
spending on defensive measures we can observe that Costa Rica has increased their defensive 
spending 31,7 % in 2011 - the third largest increase in Central America. Furthermore there has 
been an  increase in defensive spending in the entire Central American region the past year, 
suggesting a general trend of militarisation (Military Balance, 2012, p.361 pp.). For Costa Rica 
this pattern has been spurred equally out of the drug trafficking problem, as well as the border 
conflict with Nicaragua (ibid.). Here it is important to have in mind that Costa Rican 
bandwagoning with the US means that every increase in defence spending should force a 
balancing reaction from a state such as Nicaragua, as the security dilemma prescribes. Therefore 
an explanation for the large increase in Costa Rican defence spending, and the general increase 
in the entire region could very well be found in a more long-term geopolitical power struggle of 
balancing and bandwagoning.  
 
4.23 Neo-realist patterns and rhetoric in The Maritime Agreement 
We assume that neo-realistic rhetoric will be harder to locate, because of the neo-liberal features 
of Costa Rican foreign policy. We cannot expect it to be explicit as it would go against their 
statements founding their official foreign policy. However, we discovered that it is possible to 
find statements that show a concern more in line with neo-realism, although requiring reading 
between the lines.   
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It is clear that Costa Rica is concerned with solving the drug trafficking situation within their 
country, a concern made more evident with the expansion of The Maritime Agreement. Their 
rhetoric seems to become increasingly sceptical however, showing patterns of neo-realism due to 
a strong focus on national sovereignty and security, deterrence, own interests, and relative gains.  
 
The expansion of the agreement has fueled public debates, where the oppositions’ objections are 
coloured by patterns of neo-realism, as a concern of sovereignty and security are apparent. The 
opposition stays sceptical to the government, and have argued that the expansion of the 
agreement is a threat to national sovereignty: "We want to fight drug trafficking, but we do not 
accept the docking or prolonged stay of military ships in our country, because it violates our 
Constitution and our national sovereignty”(Inside Costa Rica, 2011). As expected, the country's 
territory, and the aim of security is a substantial focus. The opposition do not accept a 
“prolonged stay,” as they argue that this is a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state of Costa 
Rica. As previously mentioned, neo-realists argue that a state would no longer seek additional 
power if it meant a compromise of security. The opposition make it clear that they are not willing 
to make a compromise like this. Hence the opposition are paying great attention to the national 
sovereignty, as a first priority, and fear that this is threatened by the presence of US military. The 
quote mentioned above, made by the opposition, can further be connected to the security 
dilemma. If an army-less nation suddenly allow the stay of external military forces these would 
automatically uphold a threat to the neighbouring countries forcing them to react and thus the 
national sovereignty could be at stake. These debates of sovereignty can arguably be understood 
as acknowledging that the nature of states are natures of war, as US military presence is seen as a 
threat rather than as support in the eyes of the opposition. 
 
As stated in the section of operationalisation, patterns of bandwagoning are also considered to be 
neo-realistic. Those in favour of the agreement, also show - although not explicitly-  statements 
that support bandwagoning. In the official document for the expansion of the agreement, Costa 
Rica give the USCG the authority to govern its waters in any way they see fit: “Personnel from 
the US in Costa Rica may enjoy the liberty of movement and the right to realize activities they 
consider necessary in order to fulfill their mission” (Pacheco, 2010). Given the military power 
the US have and the freedom Costa Rica allow the USCG to display in the region as support to 
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Costa Rica, show that Costa Rica accept receiving military help from a stronger nation-state. Due 
to the vague statements put forth by Costa Rica, this suggests that they are taking part in a 
relationship that could be defined as bandwagoning. At the very same commission Chinchilla 
stated that, “It’s hard to say when these proposals will pass in Congress (...) but they will send a 
clear message to criminal groups that Costa Rica is not a paradise for them to come and hide.” 
(ibid.), indirectly threatening drug dealers by verbally confronting them.  
 
The rhetoric used in the debates of the agreement is in accordance with the expected patterns. 
Whether it is the Government’s use of indirect deterrence, the public showing concern to a new 
military emergence, the opposition counterarguing the government's acceptance of the expansion 
and prolonged stay of US troops, or the government appealing for Inter-American attention. In 
any of the situations there is a clear focus on national sovereignty. 
 
4.24 Sum of neo-realism on The Maritime Agreement  
Analysing the case of The Maritime Agreement in line with the neo-realist patterns, it can be 
discerned that Costa Rica exhibit a clear bandwagoning behaviour. Both in their rhetoric, 
expressing an acceptance of American dominance, and in their actions, it is evident that The 
Maritime Agreement symbolises more than just the combat against drug trafficking. However, 
Costa Rican rhetoric can also be traced to relative gain concerns, illustrated by scepticism 
towards the agreement. The US agenda of power projection can be expected to invoke the 
security dilemma, and it is likely that the past years’ increase in defensive spending in Central 
America is a reaction to this. Therefore, we can identify patterns of alliance-making, 
bandwagoning and balancing behaviour, and hard power measures such as deterrence, following 
The Maritime Agreement. 
 
4.25 Neo-liberalist patterns and actions in The Maritime Agreement 
Following Costa Rican foreign policy, we would expect to find patterns of cooperation that are 
not only in their own interests, but serve as a benefit to all. Cooperation has been shown to be a 
big part of Costa Rica’s methods through their use of institutions, but cooperation with the goal 
of absolute gains provide further evidence for Costa Rica’s neo-liberalist tendencies. The 
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concept of cooperation between states lies at the crux of liberalist theory. On top of this, to show 
intentions of absolute gains will show that nation-states are not only concerned with the interests 
of their own country but show faith in humankind and, attempt to make the world better.  
 
Costa Rica made an agreement with the US that gave their Coast Guards access to Costa Rican 
territory as a way to combat the increasing problem with drug cartels. The congress of Costa 
Rica decided to open its borders to 46 U.S. warships (following helicopters and planes) and 
7.000 U.S. marines from July through to the end of the year with the following task: “The U.S. 
military’s stated mission is to interdict drug dealers and arm merchants, as well as expedite 
humanitarian missions” (Wellen, 2010). Costa Rica stands in a particularly important spot 
between the drug producers in the south and the drug pushers in the north. The transfer of drugs 
has created tension and violence throughout the Latin American region. Costa Rica stands in a 
unique position to stop drug trafficking from the south to the north, giving them a particular 
responsibility to put an end to the violence and related problems drug trafficking creates. So, 
since Costa Rica does not have an army, it is willing to cooperate with a stronger, more capable 
state in order to put a stop to non-state actors - who are unwilling and incapable of cooperating 
through institutions - for the benefit of all.  
 
4.26 Neo-liberalist patterns and rhetoric in The Maritime Agreement 
Official statements from Costa Rican leaders, in regards to the US Maritime Agreement, is 
highly limited, especially statements using a similar liberalist rhetoric as the one Costa Rica 
normally emphasises on. This raises questions due to the fact that Costa Rica since abolishing 
their military, has had an overwhelming use of neo-liberal rhetoric. Contrastingly, statements 
from the opposition are in no lack, creating a notable unevenness in debates regarding The 
Maritime Agreement. As stated by Adam Isacson, a senior associate in the Washington Office on 
Latin America: “Once again, the government has not released a single public statement on this - 
no one is talking about it” (Shansky, 2010). The Chinchilla administration has officially stated 
that the allowance of US navy presence is to attend humanitarian operations. One must argue that 
the agreement seems to be framed by a lack of transparency, which is shown in the many 
opposing groups and civil protests, indicating a population who feel left out of the political 
decision.   
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Connected with The Maritime Agreement, is the war on drug trafficking. Notably, official 
statements by state leaders are easily found on this threat. Costa Rica's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Enrique Castillo-Barrentes, has sent a request to the UN for the prioritisation of an 
institutional cooperative solution. Claiming that Costa Rica considers it a necessity to develop a 
stronger link between UN and the affected nations. Castillo-Barrentes stated: “...that drug 
traffickers (should) be viewed as a real threat to peace and international security” (UN News 
Centre, 2012). Henceforth Costa Rican leaders portray drug trafficking as a threat to peace and 
international security, rather than just on a national level. This is in line with their emphasis on 
institutionalism, and their belief in cooperation as a means to reach peaceful and effective 
solutions. President Chinchilla adds that drug trafficking has escalated further, she appeals to UN 
Security Council: 
 
“We want the Security Council to consider narcotics trafficking and organized crime as a threat 
to peace and security internationally. From our point of view, this definition makes sense 
because in our nations, [the effects of drug trafficking] are similar to acts of terrorism in other 
parts of the world.” (Fendt, 2012).  
 
Considering drug trafficking as a threat that is crossing borders and thus is coloured by 
transnationality, the Costa Rican President calls for international help. Equating the drug 
trafficking with terrorism is a strong symbolic comparison with a threat that is not only global, 
but also intangible, as the enemy, being a non-state actor is harder to identify than for instance a 
state actor. The act of appealing to the international community supports that Costa Rica find an 
internationally shared effort necessary for solutions to the drug issue. The threat is thus 
considered greater than territories and borders. 
 
Despite the fact that there has been a lack of transparency in regards to the US Maritime 
Agreement, it is possible to see patterns of neo-liberalism in governmental statements regarding 
drug trafficking. Appealing to the UN, and demand for international cooperation in order to fight 
the transnational nature of drug trafficking, is in line with neo-liberalists approaches. Despite of 
this, the rhetoric only follows the expected patterns in limited matters.  
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4.27 Sum of neo-liberalist actions and rhetoric in the Costa Rica Maritime 
Agreement 
Elaborating on the neo-liberal patterns of expectancy, the neo-liberal nature of Costa Rican 
actions are very limited. Despite of this, an emphasis on cooperation due to their actions, has 
been found. Rhetorically, Costa Rican leaders have followed expected patterns. Emphasising on 
solutions through international institutions, and cooperation, Costa Rican leaders rhetorically 
reject that solutions should be found through coercive means. Furthermore they define the threat 
of drug trafficking as being a global threat needing transnational cooperative solutions, rather 
than solutions reached by a single nation-state. Despite of this, it is important to be aware of the 
limited official statements made by the leaders of Costa Rica. 
 
4.3 The Border Conflict  
4.31 Outline of the border conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua  
Our second case revolves around the border conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In 2005 
Costa Rica successfully won a case against Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice 
concerning navigational rights on the San Juan River, a river acting as a border between the two 
nations. The border conflict re-emerged in 2010 when Nicaragua placed their soldiers on the 
disputed territory and started a river-dredging project and dumped the remains on Costa Rican 
soil (CNN, 2010). This sparked the border dispute anew as both sides were in disagreement over 
where the border lay. After seven treaties, awards, and many deals it has led to confusion over 
the exact placement of the border the two countries share (Jacobs, 2012). After Costa Rica 
accused Nicaragua of abusing border agreements, Nicaragua claimed to be on right side of the 
border as per the calculations of Google Maps. This has led to what is called the Google Maps 
war (Jacobs, 2012). After Nicaragua posted soldiers on the disputed area and replaced the Costa 
Rican flag with the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican president Laura Chinchilla immediately called for 
an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) to resolve the issue. On 
top of that, President Chinchilla has, in an official statement, urged citizens to restrain from 
picking up arms after Nicaragua’s alleged violation of border limits (CNN, 2010).  
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4.32 Neo-realist patterns and actions in the border conflict between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua 
When handling the Nicaraguan border conflict it can not be denied that the close connection 
between Costa Rica and the US has played a part in regards to why Nicaragua has not taken a 
more thorough advantage of their neighbours lack of military measures. Generally, though, Costa 
Rica have handled this dispute by their own means. This entails positioning heavily armed police 
forces along the river as an answer to Nicaraguan employment of armed military troops and 
continuous neglect of orders from the International Court of Justice (Rogers (a), 2011; Rogers, 
2010). Furthermore this conflict has seen the Costa Rican government recreate an otherwise 
abolished paramilitary border patrol force, and increase defence infrastructure such as heliports 
along the border (ibid.). Part of this increase in defence infrastructure is the initiative to build a 
160 km long highway along the San Juan River, as a defensive measure against the possible 
invasion of Nicaragua (Rogers (a), 2011). The building of the highway has sparked massive 
protest from Nicaragua as it allegedly destroying the environment of the San Juan River, 
although the Costa Rican government claim it is a necessary measure because of the way 
Nicaragua has handled the conflict (Rogers, 2011). In an open letter to the UN Costa Rica 
explain their actions:  
 
“Due to the continued acts of hostility by the Nicaraguan Government, Costa Rica declared a 
national emergency with the objective of carrying out actions in defense of our territorial 
integrity...” (Rogers (a), 2011). 
 
It is evident that Costa Rica takes a defensive approach to the conflict, bluntly noting that 
Nicaraguan hostilities and infringements of the national sovereignty is forcing them to take 
action. The Costa Rican government stresses that the building of the highway is a way to 
mobilize border patrols along the northern border so as to protect it, and if necessary repel, 
hostile actions from Nicaragua (ibid.). Indeed the fact that the road at certain points is no more 
than 10 meters from the riverbank of a river notorious for its floodings, indicates that there is 
also a symbolic message in the highway project (Rogers (a), 2011). This form for security-action 
can be categorized as defensive, or deterring. It also underlines that Costa Rica can be expected 
to take up hard power measures should they feel pressured to do so, as the highway makes the 
transportation of personnel along the border quicker and more efficient.  
41 
 
The increase in defence infrastructure, such as the heliports and the grand highway project, 
should be held up against the fact that Costa Rica has triple the defensive budget of Nicaragua, 
illustrating their general focus on national security. Also following the general increase in 
defence spending in the region, analysed in regards to The Maritime Agreement, it can be 
expected that Nicaragua will react to Costa Rican defensive infrastructural improvements, seeing 
it as an act of deterrence, as the security dilemma dictates. 
 
In a continuation of the conflict, Nicaragua filed a case to the Central American Court of Justice 
because of the Costa Rican highway project. In this complaint, Nicaragua argued that the 
highway project causes irrefutable damage to the San Juan River. Costa Rica however, will not 
recognize the Central American Court of Justice as having any jurisdiction to rule in the conflict, 
and has boycotted hearings in the court (Rogers, 2012). In July 2012 The Central American 
Court of Justice ordered Costa Rica to suspend the construction of the highway, but Costa Rica 
has rejected to comply arguing that the president of the court is Nicaraguan and therefore not 
objective (Leiva, 2012). Again national interest come before any ruling of an international or 
regional organisation, demonstrating that when concerned with national security Costa Rica is 
ready to act unilaterally, violating multi- or bilateral agreements (ibid.). 
This also displays that when a nation-state such as Costa Rica stand with their back against the 
wall, it is ready to acknowledge the saying of Kenneth Waltz that : “...states must be prepared to 
use violence at any time or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbours” 
(Waltz, 1979, p.102). This shows that although receiving assistance from another nation-state, 
Costa Rica is fully capable of taking military and hard power measures in defence of the national 
security on themselves. 
 
4.33 Neo-realist patterns and rhetoric in the border conflict between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua 
When looking at Costa Rica and their rhetorical approach in relation to the abolishment of 
military and the Nicaragua case, we have found several situations where the use of rhetoric fits 
within the patterns of expected neo-realist behaviour. It is comprehensible that the rhetoric shows 
a concern of national borders and territory. The basis of the disagreement and the conflictual 
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debate originates from a focus on territory and disputed areas. Hence, the rhetoric framing the 
conflict originates from a neo-realism, colouring the debate by concerns of national sovereignty 
and security. 
 
The public debate about the border dispute also seems to include the patterns of neo-realism, 
where the actual intentions of increasing the military defences in the disputed area are discussed 
(The Military Balance, 2012, p.362). One could speculate whether the government only aim to 
improve the military defence in a short-term perspective, or if it is also preparing to create armed 
forces. This concern is illustrated by the opposition, stressing that the re-enforcement would 
violate the constitution and national integrity. 
  
When Nicaragua positioned soldiers in the disputed area, the border conflict escalated (CNN, 
2010). This development affected the rhetoric of President Chinchilla, making it more aggressive, 
exemplified by the following statement: "This is not a border problem, it is the invasion of one 
nation to another." (Walker, 2010). This statement is obviously concerned with the nation and its 
territory, and furthermore Chinchilla classifies Nicaraguan actions as an ‘invasion’, thus 
suggesting that the nature of the dispute has been transformed into real actions. Other official 
statements shows this distinct pattern as well. In a letter sent to the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister 
by the Costa Rican counterpart in 2010, once more sheds light to the territorial and sovereignty 
concern: "For the Costa Rican government, these actions constitute an unacceptable violation of 
its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are absolutely indefensible by Nicaragua," (CNN, 
2010). Costa Rica even use the expected rhetoric when appealing to the international society to 
acknowledge the so-called invasion by Nicaragua, in this case the UN institution: “The objective 
is to allow the Republic of Costa Rica the full exercise of its sovereignty in the frontier zone to 
protect its territorial integrity and repel any hostile actions against the nation,” (Rogers, (b) 
2011). The focus of national security and interests is evident. Taking a more thorough look at 
this statement, the means of hard power is noticeable as well, in the form of deterrence and 
threats. The comment of  “...exercise of its sovereignty in the frontier zone” indirectly consists of 
a threat, making the enemy aware that they can expect a Costa Rican reaction in order to protect 
their territory and thus national sovereignty . 
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A last example of the deliberate, but somewhat hidden deterrence and threats within the Costa 
Rican rhetoric is the famous quote of Chinchilla, warning the Nicaraguans not to be too 
courageous in their actions: “I want to remind ‘esos señores del norte’ (the gentlemen of the 
north) that only ‘cobardes‘ (cowards) are courageous against the defenseless.” (Sanchez, 2011). 
 
 4.34 Sum of neo-realist actions and rhetoric in the border conflict 
In the Nicaragua case we see how the expected patterns of neo-realism can easily be applied. 
First it is evident that Costa Rica in their handling of the situation resort to hard power means 
and thus is ready to use violent means if they feel threatened. Enforcing their internal forces by 
positioning heavily armed border patrol, building a highway in the name of defence, and building 
heliports along the border, is a clear method of deterrence. The security dilemma is apparent for 
both Cost Rica and the rest of the region. The tension has caused an increase in patrols and 
military means, a development only re-escalating the tension. 
 
Declining the Central American Court of Justice shows how neo-realist concepts, such as self-
interests and national sovereignty, are concerns present in Costa Rican behaviour. Also in the 
rhetoric, Costa Rica focuses on national sovereignty, national security, territory, and borders. We 
did though, expect to find more direct threats, emphasising hard power means, but instead found 
a more indirect use of deterrence. Words such as confront, battle and invasion are not used in a 
directly threatening way. In addition we had also expected to find more explicit statements, 
pointing to the expected self-based interests. But the rhetoric showed differently, as the state are 
including other states, the region and the world as a concern. Statements using the US as a 
deterrence, with the aim of warning Nicaragua, and thus the bandwagoning rhetoric, also seemed 
limited. Instead focus is on a common enemy or how Nicaragua violate their sovereignty.  
 
But the Costa Rica - US alliance, evident in the rhetoric or not, counteracts the Nicaragua - 
Venezuela alliance. As long as both Costa Rica and the US consider their national security 
threatened, or as long as they both gain from the alliance, it can be expected to function. The lack 
of clear-cut statements can be seen as either a vague form of neo-realism, or indicates that the 
nation might use a different approach.  
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4.35 Neo-liberalist patterns and action in the border conflict between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua 
The first pattern of action to take into consideration regards Costa Rica’s use of international 
institutions. We expect priority to be placed on the use of international institutions by a country 
that professes a diplomatic course of action over military means. This suggests that they make 
use of their soft power means in order to benefit from their use of international institutions. In 
order for their soft power means to work, they should be seen as an attractive actor. Following 
this, Costa Rica could be argued to be the ‘Shining City on the Hill,’ whom other countries 
would like to associate with. The use of international institutions will show their preference of 
the diplomatic course of action, and that they use soft power means as it is in their best interest 
and it benefits them most as a small state. 
 
As such, Costa Rica have made use of their soft power and used international institutions first 
and foremost in almost every situation regarding foreign relations. After abolishing their military 
in 1948, they have had no other choice than to rely on international institutions as a means of 
conflict resolution. Costa Rica have used their soft power, by way of attraction rather than 
coercion, to survive in the international society. In 1955, when Nicaraguan and Venezuelan 
sandinista’s threatened to invade Costa Rica, the government immediately called the attention of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) in order to quell rising chance of invasion. As a first 
major diplomatic victory, the OAS unanimously approved the Costa Rican request to send an 
investigative commission to verify the allegations put forth against Nicaragua and Venezuela 
(Invasion Del 55). The US stood behind Costa Rica as well, as they have the role of being the 
proponents of democracy in a communist-ridden, rebellious region: 
 
“Figueres is a true democrat and a proven friend of the United States. We need democratic 
administrators and reformists in Latin American to take the pulse off the communist struggle for 
power” (Invasion Del 55) - Paul Douglas US senator. 
 
This statements proves the longstanding relationship between the US and Costa Rica. 
Furthermore it shows the gains both nations get from the alliance, as Costa Rica has a powerful 
nations’ support, and US has a democratic friend in a region highly marked by communism.  
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Since the abolishment of the military, Costa Rica have put emphasis on using international 
institutions as the first option to mediate for a resolution between states, and have used their 
image to make it work in their favour. 
 
As a more recent example of the Costa Rica - Nicaragua disputes, in what spurred a chain of 
conflicts after Nicaragua denied Costa Rica access to the river, Costa Rica indicted Nicaragua 
with breaking the previously agreed Cañas-Jerez Treaty of 1858, bringing them to the 
International Court of Justice in 2005 in an attempt to solve the dispute diplomatically 
(International Court of Justice, 2009, p.20). Making use of international law has been a priority 
for Costa Rica since then. The border dispute related to the usage and ownership of the river 
continued in 2010 when Nicaragua assumed full control of the river and the area surrounding it. 
The Costa Rican government called for an emergency meeting of the OAS in order to mediate 
the border dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, before they took matters into their own 
hands. When Nicaragua already placed troops on the border, Costa Rica decided to take the 
institutional route instead. The OAS passed a ruling – by a vote of 22 to 2 – for both countries to 
“...avoid the presence of military or security forces in the [disputed] area” (Rogers, 2010), 
giving favour to Costa Rica’s preferred course of peaceful resolution. Only Nicaragua and 
Venezuela voted against the ruling. This again shows another clear example of the influence and 
support Costa Rica have in diplomacy by way of their soft power. Nicaragua, however, ignored 
the ruling and kept troops on the border. Costa Rica again insisted on taking the institutional 
route instead of matching hard power and escalating matters into violence. In early 2011, two 
months after the dispute began, Costa Rica again took Nicaragua to the International Court of 
Justice and accused them “of flagrantly breaching international law by putting troops on 
disputed land” after Nicaragua ignored the initial ruling produced by the OAS (Corder, 2011). 
This shows a consistent pattern of soft power usage in the institutional arena which agrees with 
neo-liberalism. 
  
In line with making use of institutions after abolishing their military, it is expected that Costa 
Rica also practice restraint when conflicts arise. This would show an enormous commitment to 
peaceful resolution - rather than taking up arms - which requires the use of diplomacy. These are 
concepts that make up the foundation of liberalism and neo-liberalism. As their official foreign 
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policy has suggested, and in line with their insistence in using institutions as a medium for 
conflict resolution - as provided evidence for above - there should appear a pattern of 
peacekeeping in the face of threats and rising violence. Since the concepts of non-violence and 
soft power means overlap it will be expected that they will mention similar, if not the same 
instances of conflicts. First, to reiterate, the invasion of 1955 shows the first instance Costa Rica 
had, to show their commitment to non-violent resolution after the abolishment of their military. 
When threats of invasion began to sprout, Costa Rica insisted on the use of institutions and 
called on the OAS as a way to quell looming violence. As mentioned above, Costa Rica in 2010 
again looked to solve the border dispute with Nicaragua non-violently and by the use of 
institutions. Even when Nicaragua ignored such requests (Rogers, 2012), Costa Rica insisted on 
a peaceful resolution by taking matters higher up to Den Haag, using the International Court of 
Justice.  
  
Another, and more clearer example of practicing restraint in the face of violence came in the 
1980’s when there was a rising conflict of ideologies in Central America. With sandinistas’ 
communist sentiments swelling and violence looming with opposition from the contras, Costa 
Rica stood in the middle of a conflict it did not want to partake in. Then-president of Costa Rica 
Luis Monge, claimed neutrality in a conflict it particularly stood at a crossroads in. With pressure 
from the US to pick up arms to fight communism and their neighbours to the north posing a 
particular threat, Costa Rica fought to remain neutral and non-violent (Rankin, 2012, p.146-147). 
Due to unforgiving circumstances, including a crumbling economy and security that could not be 
guaranteed by the government, Costa Rica had to fold under pressure from the US and 
reluctantly allow their troops to station themselves in Costa Rica. The government as well as its 
people, were dissatisfied with the situation and looked for change. Cue Oscar Arias. In the 1986 
elections in Costa Rica, with a campaign message of a promise to retreat to neutrality and a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict, the Costa Rican people voted Oscar Arias into office to allow 
him to negotiate for a peaceful resolution by diplomatic means. In 1987, Oscar Arias drew up the 
Central American Peace Plan that allowed Costa Rica to remain neutral and non-violent, and 
brought peace back to the region. In the same year Arias was awarded with the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his efforts (Rankin, 2012, p.149). Time and time again, Costa Rica have shown a 
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commitment to non-violent resolution and come off as the proponents of peaceful means in a 
region that is prone to violence. 
 
4.36 Neo-liberal patterns and rhetoric in the border conflict between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua    
The dispute between Costa Rica and its neighbouring country has tested Costa Rica’s priority of 
using soft means of power and rhetoric coloured by neo-liberalism. On top of this, the nation has 
at several occasions stated their belief in reaching solutions through cooperation and diplomacy, 
rather than settling the matters by using hard power and coercion.  
 
Despite a long unfriendly history, Costa Rica still insist on cooperating and setting a stage for 
dialogue with Nicaragua through the use of diplomacy. Former Costa Rican President Figueres 
says that despite the tensions between the nations, the leaders of the representative countries 
must communicate well, stressing the importance of dialogue in an international society: “...we 
have this problem with our neighbor and we want to get along with them. We need to get along 
with them.” (Dessoff (n.y.)). Although tensions between the two countries remain, Costa Rican 
leaders emphasise that the possibilities of a peaceful and cooperative relationship are still an 
option. As their actions make it quite clear, a communicative course of action through the usage 
of the international society is the preferred route for a fair resolution. 
 
The belief in achieving peace, hence the existence of non-conflictual relations between nations, 
is highly connected with support to transnational cooperation, as well as diplomacy. To set an 
example, President Chinchilla states that, despite the fact that her country has suffered many 
aggressive incursions from Nicaragua, she is, “...willing to overlook those hostilities and has the 
“utmost confidence” both countries can work together on the drug problem” (William, 2012). 
Setting their border disputes aside, Chinchilla calls for Nicaraguan cooperation as a solution to 
their shared threat of drug trafficking. Moreover, she clearly differentiates between the means of 
conducting power, indicating a strong emphasis and confidence in using cooperative soft power 
strategies, rather than force. The quote mentioned above suggests that Chinchilla is looking to 
cooperate with none-other than their hostile neighbours in search for collective security, for the 
benefit of both, against a non-state actor. In other words, Chinchilla suggests that solutions need 
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to be found outside hard power strategies, making it clear that the use of cooperation through 
their soft power means is the optimal option for both states.  
 
With direct regard to the 2010 border dispute, we find that what Costa Rica do is compatible 
with what they say. This is not in the least surprising as Costa Rica maintain an image of being 
the proponents of democracy in their region and are expected to fill that role. When Costa Rica 
took Nicaragua to the OAS in an emergency meeting, President Chinchilla stressed the 
importance of maintaining peace and reaching a resolution that does not require violence. What 
Costa Rica ultimately did was take Nicaragua to the OAS. After Nicaragua ignored the ruling 
produced by the OAS, Costa Rica insisted on a peaceful resolution through the use of institutions, 
even in the face of conflict: “This is our strength, the strength of reason and not the strength of 
arms” (CNN, 2010). On top of that, President Chinchilla, in an official statement, urged citizens 
to restrain from picking up arms after Nicaragua’s alleged violation of border limits (CNN, 
2010). President Chinchilla uses rhetorical tools to make an obvious differentiation of Costa 
Rica’s actions from those of the threatful Nicaragua. These instances of public discourse, 
showing the public what Costa Rica’s intentions are, are compatible with the actions they took 
since this particular dispute began. Making use of international law such as through the OAS and 
the International Court of Justice and asking for patience and cooperation from its citizens, puts 
the Costa Rican government in a neo-liberalistic line of rhetoric and action. This is made evident 
in the following quote by President Chinchilla: 
     
“Finally, thanks in part to the urgent orders of the International Court of Justice, the 
Nicaraguan contingents had to leave our ground. Nonetheless, while we waited for the final 
ruling of the Court, Nicaragua, ignoring its orders, has continued the provocations and 
violations during the provisional measures; more so, it has threatened with other actions that 
can infringe on our territory. We hope that this does not occur. But, if it were, we will reactivate 
our action using the mechanisms of the international system” (Costa Rica Archives, 2011). 
 
Highlighting Nicaragua’s choice of dismissing the decision made by the International Court of 
Justice, Chinchilla further adds that she will not hesitate to file Nicaragua to institutions of the 
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international system again. This indicates a consistent support and use of institutions, which is 
expected due to neo-liberal patterns found in their actions.     
 
4.37 sum of neo-liberalism in the border conflict between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua  
Expectedly, the rhetoric and the actions Costa Rica produced with regards to their ongoing 
disputes with Nicaragua are significantly compatible. Their insistence on cooperation through 
rhetoric and actions, despite aggressive actions from Nicaragua, show a clear pattern of neo-
liberalist tendencies in their method of foreign policy. Since the abolition of the military in 1948, 
and their first conflictual encounter with Nicaragua in 1955, Costa Rica have showed a 
consistent behaviour that fits into the neo-liberalistic patterns. In the 1980’s, caught between two 
oppositions, Costa Rica struggled to stay neutral. Eventually, elected president Oscar Arias was 
able to apply input from international law as a way to solve the ongoing war, for which he won 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. The actions Costa Rica have taken with regards to the recent 
2010 border dispute with Nicaragua also correlate with their rhetoric. Costa Rica used support 
from the international society after aggressive advances made by Nicaragua. The statements put 
forth by Costa Rican officials, with regards to this conflict, also fit and explain the actions they 
took, insisting on; international law, diplomacy, non-violence, and cooperation. The reappearing 
conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua has allowed Costa Rica to show, through action and 
rhetoric, their explicit and direct choice of cooperative and peaceful resolution through the 
international society. 
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5) Explanatory power  
Having conducted our analysis of how Costa Rican rhetoric and actions fit into the selected 
patterns of  neo-realist and neo-liberalist behaviour, we have come to various conclusions. In 
connection to neo-realism, we found that the patterns expected in the rhetoric of the Costa Rican 
government could be identified, but mainly in an indirect way. It is clear that the Costa Rican 
Government do not neglect the importance of sovereignty, borders or security, but their rhetoric 
is more focused on deterrence than on direct threats. Hence an indirect rhetoric of hard power 
measures was found only when national security was threatened. In accordance with neo-realists’ 
expectations of Costa Rican behaviour, priorities of security and sovereignty become 
increasingly visible as threats escalated. The neo-realist patterns we were looking for can all be 
verified, but it is important to emphasise that they have been identified as defensive actions. The 
US Maritime Agreement is an insurance against drug trafficking and drug cartels, and the 
highway along the San Juan River and the increases in defence spending are not offensive 
measures, but rather emergency precautions. Therefore the patterns of Costa Rican rhetoric and 
behaviour have the characteristics of defensive-realism. The somewhat vague neo-realist rhetoric 
we have identified, for example in their statements of the Maritime Agreement, support this as it 
shows the weaknesses of Costa Rican power, illustrated by the bandwagoning with the US, and 
the recurring bullying by neighbours Nicaragua.  
 
In terms of the neo-liberalistic concepts, we have identified a clear pattern of neo-liberal rhetoric, 
one that almost completely overlaps with their actions. Costa Rican leaders have, since the 
abolishment of the military, paid great attention to the use of neo-liberal rhetoric. Our analysis 
shows that the contemporary Costa Rican government emphasise on cooperation - both through 
rhetoric and action - as the main way of handling external conflicts. We have identified human 
rights to be a specific issue area of Costa Rica, a strategy that is in line with neo-liberalism, 
providing Costa Rica with an almost traditional liberal image. In relation to this, the neo-liberal 
concepts we were looking for were to a very high degree identified in the actions of Costa Rica, 
exemplified by the stubborn attempts to solve the border conflict with Nicaragua using 
diplomacy and international institutions. 
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Nevertheless, the analysis has also exposed breaches in the actions and rhetoric of Costa Rica in 
terms of following the selected patterns. In our neo-liberal patterns, the fact that Costa Rica has 
neglected the Central American Court of Justice in connection to their highway building, shows 
a contradiction between their emphasis on international organisations, and their actions when 
facing acute threats. When actually looking at the number of times Costa Rica have utilised the 
International Court of Justice in comparison to other nation-states in the Central American region, 
militarised nations such as Nicaragua and Honduras have used the institution more than Costa 
Rica (International Court of Justice: List of Cases referred to the Court since 1946 by date of 
introduction). This is interesting because, following the neo-liberal patterns, it should be 
expected that a nation-state without an army would have no other choice than to use international 
organisations when facing conflicts.  
 
In addition to this, the analysis of the two cases has shown that the rhetoric matching the neo-
liberal patterns along with the action of involving international organisations in conflict 
resolution, has not occurred without also taking preemptive defensive-realist measures. In terms 
of neo-realism, the fact that even when having declared a state of emergency, Costa Rica do not 
resort to recreate an army, and still seek a diplomatic solution to the Nicaraguan conflict. These 
patterns do not fit with the neo-realist conceptions. Furthermore even though the abolishment of 
the military can be explained as an act of bandwagoning or as a symbol of an alliance, it still 
does not make sense for a small nation-state to expose themselves as Costa Rica have done by 
abolishing their military. 
 
The analytical approach of exploring how the behaviour of Costa Rica fit within the outlined 
patterns of neo-realism and neo-liberalism has shown that both theories can explain the majority 
of Costa Rican actions. This entails that the Costa Rican government has handled the external 
threats posed by the two cases with both neo-realistic and neo-liberal tools.  
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6) Conclusion 
Comparing our patterns with the actual actions of the Costa Rican government we find that the 
neo-realistic and neo-liberalistic patterns were followed to an almost equal degree. It is fair to 
say that Costa Rica take both neo-liberalist and neo-realist measures into account when handling 
external threats. When facing actual sudden threats, they turn to defensive realism and measures 
of hard power, but not before they have tried neo-liberal measures of diplomacy, international 
organisations and cooperation which require soft power. The fact that Costa Rica are blending 
hard and soft power measures also means that the patterns of both approaches have an equal 
amount of breaches, as well as overlaps. The consequences of the breaches and overlaps suggest 
that they use what could be defined as a combination of these powers - smart power - which will 
be elaborated upon later.  
  
When correlated with the patterns of rhetoric it is possible to discern that when facing threats, 
although discrete, Costa Rica use hard power motives and neo-realist measures. Neo-liberal 
arguments are however more clear and salient, leading us to believe that Costa Rica are fully 
aware of the need to protect their international image of a non-violent, human rights-promoting, 
army-less nation. When having no army, and a pacifist world image, a nation-state such as Costa 
Rica will always find themselves in a defensive position when facing threats. According to the 
findings in our cases this seems to entail that there is a thin line between a neo-liberal solution to 
an imminent problem such as the involvement of a third party arbiter, and a defensive-realist 
hard power manoeuvre such as the positioning of armed units, or the building of the San Juan 
highway. From the findings of the analysis we can therefore conclude that the official policies of 
Costa Rica illustrate traditional liberal rhetoric, such as non-violence and global cooperation. 
However when facing external threats Costa Rica turn to neo-liberal rhetoric still emphasising on 
cooperation and transnational solutions, but also acknowledge the importance of borders and 
security, and the possibility of conflict. From a neo-realist perspective, the neo-liberalist rhetoric 
Costa Rica emphasise upon, reflects their limited means of hard power. Thus, neo-liberalist 
rhetoric is not deliberate but is seen as a sign of weakness. In actions this amounts to involving 
international organisations, and in some cases international cooperation. 
 
53 
However when either facing acute threats to the national sovereignty or security, or when the 
neo-liberal policies show discrepancies, Costa Rica turn to defensive realism, which shows that 
they are fully capable of taking precautions of a military nature. This is one reason why we find 
both the neo-liberalist and neo-realist patterns in Costa Rican behaviour.  
 
This further illustrates the fundamental problem of soft power and the use of international 
organisations when handling conflicts. If the opposite nation-state do not accept the norms and 
rules of international law, such as court rulings, it will not have any effects, which is why Costa 
Rica is forced to resort to hard power means. If the nation-state refuse to acknowledge rules and 
abide by their own actions, they will have little consequences to suffer, as the case with 
Nicaragua has shown. It also shows that while intending to deal with external threats with the 
tools of cooperation and international organisations, this is not fully feasible in a conflict-prone 
region, such as Central America is in contemporary times. As President Chinchilla has stated, 
Costa Rica initially gain security from their official liberal image, and will, at least, attempt to 
deal with external threats through soft power means. However if this was sufficient, it would not 
be necessary to resort to hard power and we would not see efforts to deter neighbouring states or 
increase defence spending.  
 
With the case of the small nation-state of Costa Rica it is important to make the distinction 
between a nation without a military, and a nation without hard power measures. As the analysis 
of the two cases has shown, Costa Rica only fit into the former category. In light of this, we can 
conclude that Costa Rica handle external threats by a blend of neo-liberalistic tools compatible 
with the neo-liberal patterns we expected to find, and a need to resort to hard power means that is 
best defined as weak defensive-realism.  
 
Based on the patterns they fit, it is clear that Costa Rica prioritize on using neo-liberalistic 
concepts. Due to their surroundings and their geopolitical situation, however, Costa Rica are 
limited in using neo-liberalist patterns of behaviour as their neighbours are not willing to comply. 
This presents a dilemma as their insistence on neo-liberalism limits the possibility of using neo-
realist patterns of behaviour, which they are forced towards. When Costa Rica have set a 
discourse that strongly emphasises on neo-liberalist values, it is difficult to simply switch to a 
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neo-realist course of action as that would invalidate the insistence of neo-liberalism their set 
beforehand. This is how we are able to observe how Costa Rica fit patterns of, first neo-
liberalism and, consequently neo-realism. 
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7) Perspectives and further considerations      
In the process of reaching our conclusions, new questions and considerations have appeared. 
Throughout the investigation of how Costa Rica handle external threats, we have gained a broad 
contextual insight of the nation. Furthermore we have gained thorough knowledge of the IR 
theories of neo-liberalism and neo-realism. To sum up, we must acknowledge that our selected 
IR approaches, have not single-handedly been sufficient in providing an adequate explanation to 
Costa Rican behaviour. Hence, applying the theories separately to the cases, has given us 
incomprehensive results. Despite of this, the insufficient findings have also made us aware of the 
complexity of Costa Rican reality. Since Costa Rica cannot fully be classified in accordance with 
the theories, one must argue that to expose the full picture of Costa Rica, the theories must be 
supported by an additional amount of variables. Due to the vast characteristics and traits of the 
Costa Rican case, one needs to make theories interact in order to get a full understanding of the 
complex reality. 
 
During the research process, we discovered that the cases investigated, especially the Maritime 
Agreement between Costa Rica and the US, was far more complex than first realised. The group 
constantly discovered differentiating material, often presented by various actors, aiming to 
present their angle of the cases. Furthermore, investigating both the official statements (rhetoric) 
and the actual actions, we realised that a lack of transparency from the Costa Rican government, 
might have affected our empirical data. Therefore the complexity of the cases, and the limited 
access we have had to information in regards to the cases might be argued to have been a 
limiting factor of our conclusions. 
 
Having framed our empirical data with neo-liberal and neo-realists approaches, we have 
excluded numerous approaches within the field of IR. Furthermore both of our chosen theories 
originate from a positivistic methodology, making them easy to compare, but also makes our 
theoretical frames less representative within the field of IR. Thus, our conclusions are limited by 
our selections. During the research, constructivism was explicitly discussed as an approach of 
interest and relevance. The constructive suggestion that, for instance, power is socially 
constructed, thus not definitive, but rather transformative, is an interesting and highly relevant 
argument in relation to Costa Rica. This argument could be connected with a concept such as 
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soft power, which Nye himself describes as being independent of resources, but instead 
unrestrictedly socially constructed. Henceforth, one must recognise the possibility of alternative 
or differentiating conclusions if different theories had framed the research. As the conducted 
research is already framed by two theories, another solution could be to apply for instance 
constructivism to the project, alongside the chosen theories. But due to the limitations of this 
project, applying a third approach would be too great a demand to create profound research and 
conclusions. 
 
The explanatory power of neo-liberalism and neo-realism is deeply intertwined with the theories' 
priority on great nations and the possibilities and expected actions of these. In light of this, the 
theories will to a certain degree fall short when applied to a small state as Costa Rica. During our 
search for suitable theories of relevance, we found little research and conceptualisation 
emphasising small states. This can be claimed to be a limitation within the field of IR. Since 
small states, as our research also supports, do have certain strategic opportunities to gain 
influence and power in the international system, greater attention should be paid to 
conceptualising small states' positions and roles as an actor within the international society. 
 
States lacking resources to gain hard power, can adopt soft power strategies in the aim of gaining 
influence and attention in the international system. As scholars of liberalism and neo-liberalism 
have a tendency to emphasise on soft power, it is peculiar that these scholars have not been able 
to conceptualise the role of small states within the IR field to a greater extent. 
Furthermore the rise of institutionalism, and the increasing engagement institutions experience 
from states creates an international context where resources are not the only defining feature of 
state influence (Nye 2011). These developments only make studies and conceptualisations on 
small states more relevant in order to fully grasp the dynamics of the international society. 
 
7.2 Smart power 
As already elaborated upon, the complexity of Costa Rican reality indicates an insufficiency 
within the  neo-liberal and neo-realist theories. Realising that the international landscape is not 
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rigid, alternative approaches, which take a broader set of variables into considerations, need to be 
found. 
 
In 2003, Joseph Nye introduced a new type of power strategy, termed 'smart power.' 
Smart power is defined as: “The capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft 
power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced 
effectively and efficiently.” (Wilson, 2008, p.110). Classified as a 'liberal-realist' approach, smart 
power originates from elements derived from both hard power and soft power. As Nye argues 
that the ways of gaining power in the international system is changing, mainstream ideas of 
power must be developed into new approaches. According to Nye a purely realistic or liberal 
approach is not sufficient in the contemporary global system (Nye, 2011). Thus a combination of 
strategies must be applied for nations to survive and secure their long-term interests. These 
changes demand contextual intelligence in conducting power politics. In other words, one must 
consider the context and the short term and long term consequences before selecting a strategy 
on how to conduct power. 
 
As Costa Rica combines hard and soft power, the nation is challenging mainstream International 
Relations conceptions of power. Nye acknowledges that military action in certain events is a 
necessity, but further argues that soft power strategies are gaining importance in the 
contemporary international society - a society where cooperation and diplomacy is increasingly 
becoming important. It is clear that Costa Rica, as it showed in its everyday politics, supports 
Nye in the latter. But after being analysed, Costa Rica also seem to realise that hard power 
capabilities are a necessity in certain events.  
  
“...a smart grand strategy must be able to handle very different distributions of power in different 
domains and understand the tradeoffs between them (...) Contextual intelligence today requires a 
new synthesis of ‘liberal realism’ ” (Nye, 2011, p.213). 
 
In other words, to achieve the wished outcome of foreign policy, nations must vary their tools of 
power to match the context and the actors involved. Limiting a nations tools of power to either 
soft or hard power tools will not be successful in the long run. 
 
58 
In a nutshell, smart power could be of high relevance in order to understand Costa Rican 
strategies of conducting power. As concluded, liberalism is dominating official statements, and 
everyday political actions. Despite of this, when being threatened, or experiencing escalating 
conflicts, Costa Rican policies change to neo-liberalism, or defensive realism. In other words 
Costa Rica do emphasise on neo-liberal and soft power tools, but nevertheless as the analysis of 
the cases showed, hard power is used to secure the national borders and interests. In their 
relations with the United States and in their general policies and behaviours with external 
conflicts, e.g. the Nicaraguan border conflicts, we see Costa Rican leaders use contextual 
intelligence. Thus one can argue that the combination of soft and hard power seen in Costa Rica, 
could relevantly be investigated through the term smart power.  
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